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INJURED BY A TEXT:
ARTICLE III STANDING FOR TCPA TEXTING CLAIMS
Quinn Marker

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2006, nearly eighty-five percent of U.S. households had a landline
phone in their homes.1 In 2018, that number dropped to below forty
percent.2 As landlines continue to be replaced by cell phones at
groundbreaking speed,3 courts must ensure the true aims of consumer
protection laws, like the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (the
“TCPA”) are fully enforced. Article III standing has become a major
hurdle for TCPA plaintiffs, as circuit courts are split on which types of
modern communication constitute an “injury-in-fact.”4 This Note
examines the conflicting Article III standing analyses of the Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits for TCPA plaintiffs when the alleged injury is the
receipt of only a few text messages. To that end, this Note argues that a
TCPA claim based on a single text message is a sufficient “injury in fact”
for Article III standing purposes.5
Part II of this Note will first examine the TCPA and its legislative
history, and then will review the problems posed by modern
communication technology. Then, Part II will review the Article III
standing requirements imposed by federal courts and the United States
Constitution. Next, Part II analyzes two divergent applications of the
TCPA in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, particularly in their analysis of
a consumer’s standing when attempting to prove injury. Finally, Part III
argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s approach directly defies the will of
Congress, while the Ninth Circuit’s approach keeps consumers at the
1. STEPHEN J. BLUMBERG & JULIAN V. LUKE, NAT’L CTR. HEALTH STAT., WIRELESS
SUBSTITUTION: EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY,
JULY–DECEMBER
2006
4
(May
14,
2007),
available
at
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/wireless200705.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2MF-K3R5].
2. STEPHEN J. BLUMBERG & JULIAN V. LUKE, NAT’L CTR. HEALTH STAT., WIRELESS
SUBSTITUTION: EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY,
JULY–DECEMBER
2018
5
(June
2019),
available
at
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/wireless201906.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3CB-BLMJ].
3. See generally Michael DeGusta, Are Smart Phones Spreading Faster Than Any Technology in
Human
History?,
MIT
TECH.
REV.
(May
9,
2012),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2012/05/09/186160/are-smart-phones-spreading-faster-than-anytechnology-in-human-history/ [https://perma.cc/8MH8-NSNE] (discussing the rapid rise of the smart
phone use across the world with 1.4 billion mobile phones sold annually).
4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (extending judicial power of the federal courts to “cases” and
“controversies”); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding “injury in fact” to be
the first requirement of the “irreducible constitutional minimum to establish standing). Id.
5. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
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forefront and is true to the aims of the TCPA. Part III concludes with a
proposed framework for courts to ensure consumers are protected under
the TCPA.
II. BACKGROUND
While federal courts have some catching up to do, Congress and
regulators have largely faced the robocall6 challenge head-on. This Part
frames the overall landscape of the effort to curb robocalls and highlights
the roles of Congress, regulators, and federal courts. First, Section A will
review the history of telemarketing legislation leading up to and including
the TCPA. Section B will then provide an overview of the robocalling and
robotexting7 landscape and explain why it is problematic for consumers.
Next, Section C will discuss the role of Article III Standing in TCPA
claims. Finally, Section D will analyze TCPA decisions by the Ninth and
Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals.
A. The Legislative History of the TCPA
Consumer frustration over telemarketing made one of its first
appearances in Congress in 1988 with the Telemarketing Fraud
Prevention Act (“TFPA”).8 Congressmen Thomas A. Luken9 introduced
the bipartisan bill in the House of Representatives, goaded by the growth
of the telemarketing industry and the rise of “fraudulent telemarketing.”10
Luken argued the fraudulent telemarketing industry was generating
upwards of twenty billion dollars annually, while the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) was recovering less than one percent.11 Luken
reinforced six main features of the legislation, including:
(1) ordering the FTC to promulgate rules on telemarketing;
6. A robocall is defined by the FCC as a call “made with an autodialer or that contain[s] a message
made with a prerecorded or artificial voice.” FCC, FCC CONSUMER GUIDE: STOP UNWANTED
ROBOCALLS
AND
TEXTS
2
(Feb.
5,
2020),
available
at
https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/stop_unwanted_robocalls_and_texts.pdf [https://perma.cc/89T83MP6].
7. A robotext is defined by the FCC as a “text message[] sent to a mobile phone using an
autodialer” without consent. Id. at 3.
8. 134 CONG. REC. 15970 (daily ed. June 27, 1988).
9. Congressmen Tom Luken served Cincinnati as a Democratic Congressman, Mayor, and City
Councilmember. Luken, Thomas Andrew, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov/People/Listing/L/LUKEN,-Thomas-Andrew-(L000508)/
[https://perma.cc/C8XB-25QA]; (last accessed Apr. 15, 2020) see also Chris Wetterich, Political giant
Thomas Luken dies at age 92, CINCINNATI BUS. COURIER (Jan. 10, 2018),
https://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/news/2018/01/10/political-giant-thomas-luken-dies-at-age92.html.
10. 134 CONG. REC. 15972 (daily ed. June 27, 1988) (statement of Rep. Luken).
11. Id.
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(2) authorizing state Attorneys General to file suit in federal court for
violations of the Act;
(3) authorizing private citizens to file suit in federal court for violations
of the Act;
(4) prohibiting harassment by telemarketers;
(5) directing the FTC to establish a clearinghouse on telemarketing;
and
(6) directing the FTC to study autodialing and report the findings to
Congress.12
Perhaps the most important feature of the bill was that it authorized
private citizens to file claims under the TFPA in federal court.13 Luken
argued that “[t]he structure of having . . . private citizens sue in Federal
court to enforce Federal regulations is not new.”14 Congressmen Luken
cited other federal laws with similar private causes of action, such as the
Solid Waste Disposal Act and the Noise Control Act, along with antitrust
legislation.15 Republican Congressmen Michael Oxley 16 followed Luken
and supported the bill. Further, Oxley argued that allowing private parties
to sue “with certain important limitations,” would result in more effective
enforcement of the targeted telemarketing practices.17 Moreover, by
providing access to federal courts, the bill would “promote nationwide
enforcement and uniformity of decision-making.”18 Ultimately, the TFPA
was held in committee in the Senate and was never brought to a vote. 19
Although the TFPA was never enacted, the bill set the foundation for a
critical component of the TCPA claims: the private right of action.
Several iterations of what is now the TCPA were proposed in the
Senate, but it was ultimately democratic Senator Fritz Hollings who
introduced the final bill in 1991 as an amendment to the Communications
Act of 1934.20 Senator Hollings characterized the disturbance of uninvited
telemarketing as “telephone terrorism,” saying "computerized calls are
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Another Ohioan, Congressmen Oxley served Ohio’s 4th congressional district from 1981 until
2007. Oxley, Michael Garver, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
https://history.house.gov/People/Listing/O/OXLEY,-Michael-Garver-(O000163)/
[https://perma.cc/HYB2-DYWU]. (last accessed Apr.15, 2020)
17. 134 CONG. REC. 15973 (June 27, 1988) (statement of Rep. Oxley).
18. Id.
19. See All Actions, H.R. 4101,CONRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/100thcongress/house-bill/4101/allactions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22100+hr+4101%22%5D%7D&s=6&r=1 (last accessed Apr.
30, 2020) (the TFPA was held in the Senate Commerce Committee and was never passed).
20. 137 CONG. REC. 30820 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991); Automated Telephone Consumer Protection
Act, S. Res. 1462, 102nd Cong. (1991).
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the scourge of modern civilization. They wake us up in the morning; they
interrupt our dinner at night; they force the sick and elderly out of bed;
they hound us until we want to rip the telephone right out of the wall.” 21
The Senate passed the TCPA on the day it was introduced and it was sent
to the House for consideration and vote.
The House moved quickly and passed the TCPA, relying in part on
survey data that found Americans were increasingly annoyed by
salespeople.22 The surveys found that people were “very annoyed [by]
phone calls from people selling things,” and even more so by “phone calls
from a computer trying to sell something.”23 The TCPA was signed into
law on December 20, 1991 by President George H.W. Bush24 and aimed
to curb “intrusive invasion[s] of privacy” into the home at a time when
dinnertime telemarketer interruptions were becoming commonplace;
leaving consumers “outraged.”25
In its current form, the TCPA generally restricts the use of automatic
telephone dialing systems (“ATDS”), artificial and prerecorded
messages, and fax machines to send unsolicited advertisements. 26 The
TCPA provides exceptions for calls made to collect government debts and
calls to landlines for non-commercial purposes, including political calls.27
A valid TCPA claim, for purposes of this analysis, requires the plaintiff
to prove the following:
(1) the call or text was received on a cell phone, home phone, or any other
service where the receiver is charged for the call;
(2) the call or text was placed using an automatic telephone dialing system
or features a prerecorded message or artificial voice; and
(3) the call or text was made without the recipient’s consent.28

While not explicitly included in the text of the TCPA, the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) and the Supreme Court have
acknowledged that text messages fall within the bounds of the TCPA and
are synonymous with the term “call.”29 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,

21. 137 CONG. REC. 30821 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
22. H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 9 (1991).
23. Id.
24. Presidential Statement on Signing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 1651 (Dec. 20, 1991); Automated Telephone Consumer Protection Act, S. Res. 1462, 102nd
Congress (1991).
25. Telephone Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No. 102-243, § 2, ¶¶ 5-6, 105 Stat. 2394 (1991).
26. In reRules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,
68 Fed. Reg. 44144 5 (July 3, 2003).
27. 47 U.S.C.S § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii); 47 U.S.C.S § 227(b)(2)(B)(i).
28. 47 U.S.C. S § 227(b)(1)(A)-(B).
29. In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,
30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7964 n.3 (2015) available at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-15-
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writing for the 6-3 majority in a 2016 decision, characterized it as
“undisputed,” that a text message sent with an autodialer “qualifies as a
call within the TCPA.”30
Violations of the TCPA are enforced through a private right of action
in “an appropriate court of that state,”31 with state courts and federal
courts sharing concurrent jurisdiction. 32 Under the section of the TCPA
concerning robocall violators, a plaintiff can seek an injunction, financial
compensation, or both after just one violation. 33 Available financial
compensation includes any actual monetary loss suffered from a violation
or, more typically, $500 per violation—whichever is greater.34 If a
defendant is found to have violated the TCPA “willfully or knowingly,”
the court can elect to award treble damages to a prevailing plaintiff. 35
The FCC retains rulemaking and enforcement authority over the
TCPA, stemming from the agency’s creation in the Communications Act
of 1934.36 The FTC plays a supporting role in enforcing the TCPA as well,
given their enforcement role with other telemarketing legislation like the
Do-Not-Call registry37 and the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and
Abuse Prevention Act.38 Demonstrating their collaborative approach and
commitment towards preventing harmful robocalls, the two agencies
signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2003 pledging to share data
and support each other’s work.39
72A1_Rcd.pdf (“[e]xcept where context requires otherwise, our use of the term call includes text
messages”) (internal quotations omitted).
30. Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 667 (2016) (finding receipt of a single text message
included within reach of TCPA prohibition; see also Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946,
954 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We hold that a voice message or a text message are not distinguishable in terms of
being an invasion of privacy.”). Id.
31. 47 U.S.C.S § 227(b)(3).
32. Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 372 (2012) (holding state courts and federal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over private TCPA claims).
33. 47 U.S.C.S § 227(b)(3); But see 47 U.S.C.S. § 227(c)(5) (concerning the creation of a “DoNot-Call-List” and requiring “more than one telephone call within any 12-month period” to trigger
availability of a private right of action) Id.
34. 47 U.S.C.S § 227(b)(3)(B).
35. 47 U.S.C.S § 227 (b)(3).
36. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2); see also Communications Act of 1934, S. 3040, 73d Cong. § 1 (1934)
(creating the Federal Communications Commission).
37. Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, H.R. 395, 108th Cong. (2003) (establishing a Do-Not-Call
registry).
38. Telephone Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, H.R. 868, 103rd
Cong. (1994) (establishing rules for telemarketers including calling times and mandatory disclosures to
prevent deceptive calling practices).
39. Memorandum of Understanding between FCC and FTC on Consumer Protection, FEDERAL
TRADE
COMMISSION
(Nov.
2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cooperation_agreements/151116ftcfcc-mou.pdf
[https://perma.cc/98V7-EJ7G] (establishing areas of agreement, cooperation and data sharing between the
FCC and FTC on consumer protection matters and acknowledging their prior MOU regarding
telemarketing); Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC and FCC Sign Memorandum of
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B. Communication technology continues to evolve.
The communication landscape has changed drastically since the
TCPA’s passage in 1991. Arcane automated dialers have transformed into
complex operations that “spoof” Caller ID numbers and include hyperrealistic recorded voices. 40 This has led to a rapid increase in the amount
of robocalls and robotexts received by consumers every day. Nearly fifty
billion robocalls were placed in the U.S. in 2018. 41 In 2019 that number
increased to nearly sixty billion—or nearly 230 robocalls per adult each
year.42 While the FCC warns many sources of robocalling data include
both legal and welcome calls, such as school closures and prescription
drug pickup reminders,43 they have also acknowledged and continue to
address the “scourge” of the illegal and unwanted calls. 44 In fact, one
source cited by the FCC estimated that 44.6% of all calls to mobile phones
in 2019 would be illegal and unwanted scams.45 Scams regarding health
insurance, low interest rates, and student loans remain the most prevalent
types of robocalls.46
Robotexts present an entirely new challenge for both regulators and
consumers..47 On the surface, robotexts appear to be dwarfed by

Understanding For Continued Cooperation on Consumer Protection Issues (Nov. 16, 2015), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/11/ftc-fcc-sign-memorandum-understandingcontinued-cooperation [https://perma.cc/6LUS-64YQ].
40. See, Caller ID Spoofing, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/spoofing-and-caller-id
[https://perma.cc/RA2C-P733] (“Spoofing is when a caller deliberately falsifies the information
transmitted to your caller ID display to disguise their identity.”).
41. Historical
Robocalls
by
Time,
YOUMAIL,
ROBOCALL
INDEX,
https://robocallindex.4com/history/time [https://perma.cc/N4M7-V3RW] (last visited Feb. 20, 2020)
(58,536,224,700 robocalls made in 2019).
42. Id.;
U.S.
Census
Data,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/profile?q=United%20States&g=0100000US&tid=ACSDP1Y2018.DP05
[https://perma.cc/32YW-RM7J] (last visited Feb. 20, 2020) (U.S. 18+ population was 253,881,933 in
2018).
43. FCC, CONSUMER AND GOV. AFFAIRS BUREAU, REPORT ON ROBOCALLS CG DOCKET NO. 1759 2 (Feb. 2019), available at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-356196A1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2SHK-LNF6].
44. Press Release, FCC, FCC Chairman Proposes Call Blocking By Default To Help Combat The
Scourge Of Robocalls (May 15, 2019), available at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC357464A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/63FC-7MG3].
45. FIRST ORION, SCAM CALL TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS REPORT 2 (Fall 2018), available at
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/109272058817712/FirstOrion_Scam_Trends_Report_FINAL%20(002)%20(
002).pdf [https://perma.cc/68F9-8ADQ].
46. Press Release, YouMail, Nearly 48 Billion Robocalls Made in 2018, According to YouMail
Robocall Index (Jan. 23, 2019) https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/nearly-48-billion-robocallsmade-in-2018-according-to-youmail-robocall-index-300782638.html.
47. See
generally
Political
Campaign
Robocalls
&
Robotexts,
FCC,
https://www.fcc.gov/political-campaign-robocalls-robotexts [https://perma.cc/JSC7-VYP7] (last visited
Feb. 20, 2020).
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robocalls, amounting to only three percent of all text messages.48
However, with nearly 285 million smartphones in the U.S. and an
estimated two trillion text messages exchanged in 2018, this means that
over sixty billion robotexts were sent in 2018 alone.49 Cell carriers are
attempting to thwart this flood of messages directly by blocking the texts
before they reach consumers. In 2018, consumers filed over 93,000
complaints about unwanted text messages—up from 71,776 the year
prior.50 In 2019, T-Mobile experienced a twenty percent increase each
month in blocked robotexts.51 Despite this rapid increase in the number of
robotexts impacting U.S. consumers, and the seemingly widespread
understanding that text messages are included within the TCPA,52 some
courts have neglected to confer Article III standing to plaintiffs bringing
text message-based TCPA claims.
In practice, TCPA claims are often very difficult for individual
consumer plaintiffs to initiate, given the significant commitments of time
and money for a relatively modest payout. 53 As a result, a TCPA classaction industry has quietly developed. 54 Damages can add up quickly in
these class action claims with seemingly no upper limit. For instance, a
multi-level marketing company, ViSalus Inc., found itself on the wrong
end of a $925 million judgment in 2019 after placing nearly two million
unauthorized robocalls—each resulting in a $500 fine.55

48. Katherine Bindley, Prepare for Robocall’s Evil Twin: Robotext, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2019,
at B4.
49. CELLULAR TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INTERNET ASSOCIATION (CTIA), 2019 ANNUAL
SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS 4 (2019), available at https://api.ctia.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2019Annual-Survey-Highlights-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ72-74GH].
50. Bindley, supra note 48.
51. Id.
52. In re Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
of 1991, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7964 n.3, available at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-1572A1_Rcd.pdf.
53. But see Forman v. Data Transfer, 164 F.R.D. 400, 404 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (arguing the remedy
provided in TCPA is “designed to provide adequate incentive for individual plaintiffs to bring suit on their
own behalf”).
54. See SPB’s Unprecedented Podcast: Episode 2: Todd Friedman, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (Apr.
9, 2019), https://soundcloud.com/user-296303717/episode-2-todd-friedman-atds-definition-willfulnessfcc-developments (interviewing TCPA class action attorney Todd Friedman about his process and efforts
to seek out TCPA violators); see also Telephone Consumer Protection Act: Text Message Harassment,
LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C., https://www.toddflaw.com/consumer-rights/telephoneconsumer-protection-act/text-message-harassment/ [https://perma.cc/8XFN-XAU6] (last accessed Apr.
15, 2020).
55. Maxine Bernstein, Record $925 million verdict upheld in ViSalus unlawful recorded robocall
case,
THE
OREGONIAN/OREGONLIVE
(Aug.
11,
2020),
https://www.oregonlive.com/business/2020/08/federal-judge-in-oregon-upholds-record-925-milliondamages-verdict-in-unlawful-recorded-robocall-case.html [https://perma.cc/TTS7-LVEN].
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C. Article III Standing
Although Congress has provided a remedy for the “scourge” of
automated calls and text messages, Article III limits the power of federal
courts to “cases” or “controversies.”56 Federal courts are often wary of
granting jurisdiction derived from acts of Congress, in an effort to
safeguard separation of powers principles. 57 Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife58 and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins59 frame the doctrine of standing for
purposes of the TCPA.
In Lujan, the Supreme Court was confronted with a standing issue
when wildlife conservationists challenged the Secretary of the Interior’s
interpretation of the Endangered Species Act of 1973.60 The Court held
the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” was subject to a
three-part test.61 The test requires plaintiffs to prove:
(1) they suffered an “injury-in-fact;”
(2) the injury is “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged act;” of the
defendant,62 and
(3) the injury is “likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.”63
Rather than applying a lower pleading standard, the Court noted these
elements are subject to the same standard of review as other elements of
the case.64
Moreover, in order to satisfy the injury prong under Lujan the injury
must be: (a) “concrete and particularized” and (b) “actual or imminent,
not ‘conjectural or hypothetical.’”65 The injury requirement was
addressed extensively in Spokeo where the Court overturned the
affirmative standing determination of the Ninth Circuit, holding that
injury-in-fact required a concreteness finding, in addition to a separate
finding of particularity.66 An injury is particularized if it “affect[s] the
56. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2.
57. See Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1166 (11th Cir. 2019); see also THE FEDERALIST NO.
78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton), (“there is no liberty is the power of judging be not separated from the
legislative and executive powers.”).
58. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
59. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
60. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558-59 (the new interpretation of the Endangered Species Act limited its
application to only “actions taken in the United States or on the high seas,” compared to its original
application in foreign nations).
61. Id. at 560.
62. Id. (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss2/11

8

Marker: Injured by a Text

2021]

INJURED BY A TEXT

583

plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”67 An injury is concrete, the
Court directed, when it “actually exist[s]” and is “not abstract.” While an
injury need not necessarily be tangible to be concrete, intangible injuries
often require a closer look.68 In instances of intangible injuries, Congress’
judgment is “instructive and important” in determining whether an injury
rises to the level of conferring Article III standing. 69 However, this does
not mean that a “bare procedural violation” that does not harm the
plaintiff will suffice in demonstrating an Article III injury-in-fact.70 For
instance, in Spokeo, the defendant’s publication of an incorrect zip code
in an online profile was akin to a “bare procedural violation” and was not
a sufficient injury-in-fact for Article III standing purposes, even though it
did violate the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970.71 The Court also
indicated that in instances where harm is difficult to quantify, the
“violation of a [statutory] procedural right” could be a sufficient injuryin-fact under Article III.72
D. The Application of the TCPA
The Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals approach TCPA
claims in different ways. The first part of this Section reviews the Ninth
Circuit’s decision to grant Article III standing to a plaintiff who received
two unwanted text messages. The second part then reviews the Eleventh
Circuit’s refusal to grant standing to a plaintiff in similar circumstances.
1. The Ninth Circuit’s decision to grant standing to a recipient of two
unwanted text messages.
In Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Group, the Ninth Circuit held that
receipt of two automated text messages was a sufficient injury to obtain
standing under Article III, but rejected the plaintiff’s claim on other
grounds.73 In so holding, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant.74 In this case, plaintiff
Bradley Van Patten received two automated text messages in two months
from defendant Gold’s Gym, of which he was no longer a member.75
67. Id. at 1548.
68. Id. at 1549.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1550.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1549 (“In other words, a plaintiff in such a case need not allege any additional harm
beyond the one Congress has identified.”) (emphasis in original).
73.
847 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2017).
74. Id. at 1049.
75. Id. at 1041.
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The Ninth Circuit addressed whether the plaintiff had standing by first
determining whether there was an injury-in-fact, defined as an “‘invasion
of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and
‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’”76 Following the
logic in Spokeo, the Ninth Circuit asserted that a “bare procedural
violation, divorced from any concrete harm,” would not satisfy the injuryin-fact requirement of Article III. 77 However, despite the absence of text
messaging from the text of the TCPA itself, the Ninth Circuit largely
deferred to congressional judgment, focusing on the “unwanted intrusion”
of telemarketing.78 The court characterized the plaintiff’s injury as
“unsolicited contact,” which it argued was concrete and precisely the type
of injury Congress intended to prevent with the TCPA.79
According to the Ninth Circuit, standing was proper because receiving
unwanted calls and text messages, unlike other statutory violations,
“present[s] the precise harm and infringe[s] the same privacy interests
Congress sought to protect in enacting the [TCPA].”80 Therefore, the
court concluded that TCPA claims “need not allege any additional harm
beyond the one Congress has identified.”81 In this case, plaintiff’s receipt
of two text messages was a sufficient concrete injury for standing under
Article III.82 While the court found that the plaintiff had standing, it
ultimately affirmed the district court’s dismissal because the plaintiff had
not revoked his original consent to be contacted by the defendant. 83
2. The Eleventh Circuit requires a heightened level of injury for TCPA
claims.
In Salcedo v. Hanna, the Eleventh Circuit held that, while the
plaintiff’s claim facially stated a claim under the TCPA, the plaintiff did
not suffer a “concrete injury” and did not have standing under Article
III.84 The appellate court’s decision reversed the district court with

76. Id. at 1042 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
77. Id. at 1042.
78. Id. at 1043.
79. Id. at 1043; see also Golan v. FreeEats.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 950, 959 (8th Cir. 2019) (finding
receipt of two answering machine messages without prior consent to be a concrete injury).
80. Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043.
81. Id. (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016); see also Susinno v. Work
Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 351 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding receipt of single phone call violated the TCPA
saying “in asserting ‘nuisance and invasion of privacy’ resulting from a single prerecorded telephone call,
her complaint asserted the very harm that Congress sought to prevent, arising from prototypical conduct
proscribed by the TCPA.”).
82. Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043.
83. Id. at 1048.
84. Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1172 (11th Cir. 2019).
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instructions to dismiss on remand.85 In this case, plaintiff John Salcedo,
on behalf of a class, sought relief under the TCPA after he received a
single promotional text message from his former attorney.86 He sought
treble damages of $1,500 per message sent willfully or knowingly.87 The
district court held the plaintiff had standing, but it granted the defendant’s
petition for interlocutory appeal for the Eleventh Circuit to review the
same issue.88
The court first noted that rights created by Congress or executive
agencies are not “automatically enforceable in the federal courts.”89 The
court then applied the three-part test to establish the “irreducible
constitutional minimum” for standing under Lujan.90 This case turned on
the first element of that test—whether receipt of a single text message was
a sufficient injury-in-fact.91 The Eleventh Circuit also followed the
guidance of Lujan and Spokeo in its analysis of whether the injury was
concrete92 and particularized.93 The court accepted the plaintiff’s showing
that the receipt of the promotional message was a particularized harm,94
while noting that the concreteness prong required a more thorough
analysis.95 The court set a low bar for the required showing at “only an
‘identifiable trifle.’”96
The plaintiff characterized his injury as wasted time addressing the
message and that “[w]hile doing so, both plaintiff and his cellular phone
were unavailable for otherwise legitimate pursuits.” 97 The plaintiff argued
this was fundamentally aligned with a prior standing decision from the
Eleventh Circuit regarding the receipt of a single junk fax.98 The court
distinguished that case on the grounds that the process of receiving a fax
was fundamentally differently than receiving a text message.99 A fax

85. Id. at 1173.
86. Id. at 1165.
87. Id.; 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).
88. Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1165.
89. Id. at 1166.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1167.
93. Id. at n.3.
94. Id. (noting that in TCPA class actions, each member of the class must establish their own
particularized harm).
95. Id. at 1167.
96. Id. (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S.
669, 689 n.14 (1973)) (sufficiently concrete injuries for standing purposes have included $1.50 poll tax)
Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1167-68 (discussing Palm Beach Golf Club Center-Boca, Inc. v. Sarris, 781 F.3d 1245,
1252 (11th Cir. 2015)).
99. Id.
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machine is unable to both send and receive other messages during receipt
of the junk fax and incurs immediate costs for the recipient. 100 In this case,
however, the plaintiff could continue to use all functions of his phone,
suffered no “loss of opportunity,” and incurred no additional costs.101
Next, the court proceeded to the direction of Congress, noting that
“only through the rulemaking authority of the FCC” does the TCPA
extend to text messaging.102 The court argued that receiving a text
message is “qualitatively different” than the types of contact Congress
intended to guard against with the passage of the TCPA, particularly
“intrusive invasions[s] of privacy into the home.” 103 In support of this
idea, the court noted that, unlike landlines, cell phones are often silenced
and carried with people outside of their homes. 104
Finally, the court turned to history to determine whether the injury was
concrete.105 The court compared the receipt of a text message to torts such
as intrusion upon seclusion, nuisance, conversion, and trespass to
chattel.106 Perhaps not surprisingly, the court found receipt of a single text
message to be “isolated, momentary, and ephemeral,” and not comparable
to these historical tort actions. 107 Receiving a text message, the court
concluded, is more akin to having a flyer briefly waved in your face and
“not a basis for invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts.” 108 The
court argued that the ultimate inquiry for a concrete injury analysis should
be about the quality of the communication, not the quantity.109 In this case
the court held that the quality of the injury—receipt of a single text
message—did not constitute an injury-in-fact and the plaintiff, therefore,
did not have standing under Article III. 110
III. DISCUSSION
Guidance from both the Supreme Court and Congress demands that a
single text message should satisfy Article III standing requirements. First,
Section A argues the Eleventh Circuit erred when it did not confer
standing in Salcedo. Next, Section B argues the Ninth Circuit’s analysis
in Van Patten was correct and properly applies the principles set out in
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 1168.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1169 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1170.
Id. at 1171-72.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1172-73.
Id. at 1173.
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Lujan and Spokeo. Finally, Section C proposes a modern approach to
TCPA claims that honors both Supreme Court guidance and the concerns
raised by the Eleventh Circuit, while prioritizing consumer protection.
A. The Eleventh Circuit Rejects Congress and the Supreme Court in
Salcedo
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision to dismiss Salcedo’s complaint for lack
of Article III standing fails to consider the evolution of communication
technology and the high risk of fraud associated with robotexting. First,
Part 1 argues the court’s inquiry into the guidance of Congress ignores
the true intent to the TCPA. Part 2 then argues the Supreme Court showed
a willingness to allow Congress to elevate injuries even without a
historical parallel in tort.
1. The Eleventh Circuit’s examination of congressional guidance does
not go far enough.
The Eleventh Circuit missed the mark when it neglected to confer
Article III standing on plaintiff John Salcedo. Just as the receipt of two
text messages was sufficient for standing in Van Patten, the receipt of a
single text message should also suffice. The court focused its analysis on
the “injury-in-fact” requirement, particularly the concreteness of the
alleged injury.111 While the court examined the guidance of Congress, as
directed by Spokeo, for an intangible injury, the court’s analysis is shallow
and misses the true aims of the TCPA.112 In short, the plaintiff’s injury
was both concrete and particularized and fell squarely within the grasp
of the TCPA.113
However, the court argued “a single unwelcome text message will not
always involve an intrusion into the privacy of the home in the same way
that a voice call to a residential line necessarily does.”114 The court went
further, asserting that the portability of cell phones and a person’s ability
to silence them results in less of an intrusion when contact is made.115
This argument raises more questions than answers. Cell phones now play
a central role in our lives. They are omnipresent and, although the
technology is relatively new, they store information that has historically
been shielded from government intrusion. A cell phone, beyond merely
making calls in a home, travels everywhere with a person and stores
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 1166.
See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1165.
Id. at 1170.
Id.
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personal documents, private correspondence, financial information, and
more. The portability of a cell phone should, in fact, warrant heightened
protection from unwanted intrusion. While the court seemed to elevate
the importance of protecting against ringing landlines in a home, the
prospect of a vibrating cellphone during a private conversation outside of
the home is no different. Moreover district courts have suggested the
ability to silence a device has no bearing on the quality of the injury, as
demonstrated by recent decisions finding ringless voicemail technology
to be within the grasp of the TCPA .116
While the Eleventh Circuit argues congressional silence on text
messaging in the TCPA demonstrates it is not a sufficient injury for
standing purposes, congressional debate over the TCPA and related
telemarketing legislation reveals the opposite. First, Congress cited fraud
prevention as a motivating factor in its introduction of the related
Telemarketing Fraud Prevention Act in 1988. 117 Spam text messages are
increasingly used to commit fraud as well. In fact, in 2012, it was
estimated that 92% of all robotexts were fraudulent. 118 Dubbed
“smishing” (SMS phishing), scammers target groups of cell phones in an
attempt to gain personal information about as many users as they can,
using fake links and requests for passwords.119 Common scams relate to
banking, delivery services, and contest offers, and aim to catch
unsuspecting users off guard as they go about their day—cellphone in
hand.120 The risk of fraud posed by these robotexts cannot be separated
from the risk of fraud posed by a robocall to a landline. In fact, experts
argue users are actually more susceptible to fraud on their mobile device
than they are when using other devices due largely to small phone screens
and the frequent downloading of applications.121 As texting continues to
play a more prominent role in our lives, this risk continues to grow.
Next, as referenced in early congressional debates regarding
116. See Saunders v. Dyck O'Neal, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d 907, 911 (W.D. Mich. 2018) (holding
ringless voicemails to fall within the TCPA and arguing, “[t]he effect on [the Plaintiff] is the same whether
her phone rang with a call before the voicemail is left, or whether the voicemail is left directly in her
voicemail box”).
117. Congressmen Luken noted the rise in fraudulent marketing reaching $20B in 1988. 134 CONG.
REC. 15972 (daily ed. June 27, 1988) (statement of Rep. Luken.).
118. CLOUDMARK,
SMS
SPAM
OVERVIEW
3
(2012),
available
at
https://www.cloudmark.com/releases/docs/whitepapers/SMS_Spam_Overview.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U83L-8GFT].
119. See generally S. Mishra & D. Soni, SMS Phishing and Mitigation Approaches 4, 2019
TWELFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CONTEMPORARY COMPUTING (IC3), NOIDA, INDIA (Aug.
2019), available at https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8844920 [https://perma.cc/3GPX-4PV4].
120. How
to
Recognize
and
Report
Spam
Text
Messages,
FTC,
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/how-recognize-and-report-spam-text-messages
[https://perma.cc/G6QW-LEX9] (last visited Mar. 27, 2020).
121. Soni, supra note 119 (noting small screens make it difficult to see full URLs and user habit of
downloading/installing smartphone applications makes cell phones an attractive target for scammers).
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telemarketing regulation, nationwide enforcement plays a crucial role. 122
Without the TCPA in place, fraudulent text messaging would be subject
to the same patchwork of state based regulation that the TCPA sought to
prevent. The Supreme Court has even recognized the high premium
Congress placed on nationwide uniform enforcement, noting the
importance of a federal law so telemarketers could not avoid punishment
at the state level through multi-state operations.123
Finally, Congress has granted regulatory authority to the FCC to
enforce the legislation. The FCC, in turn, has recognized that a text
message is synonymous with a “call” for purposes of the TCPA.124 While
this is not dispositive of standing, it surely supports the notion that federal
courts should recognize a TCPA claim stemming from a single text
message.
Recognizing that a statutory violation does not “automatically satisf[y]
the injury-in-fact requirement,” congressional guidance nonetheless
makes clear that robotexts can be a concrete injury-in-fact.125 While
communication largely occurred on landline telephones at the time the
TCPA was passed, Congress’ motivation to curb fraudulent contact with
consumers, combined with the inclusion of a private cause of action and
their grant of regulatory authority to the FCC, demonstrates Congress’
intent to designate text messaging as a concrete injury-in-fact under
Article III.
2. Examination of Historical Torts
The Eleventh Circuit’s examination of equivalent historical torts is also
weak. The court argues receipt of a single text message is unlike intrusion
upon seclusion, trespass, nuisance, conversion, and trespass to chattel.126
While receiving a text message without consent may lack the “objectively
intense” 127 quality traditionally sought by courts for intentional torts, the
Supreme Court has directed that “Congress may ‘elevate to the status of
legally cognizable injuries to concrete, de facto injuries, that were

122. Moreover, by providing access to federal courts, the Act “promote[s] nationwide enforcement
and uniformity of decision-making.” 134 CONG. REC. 15973 (daily ed. June 27, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Oxley) (discussing Telemarketing Fraud Prevention Act of 1988).
123. Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 371-72 (2012) (holding state and federal courts
have concurrent jurisdiction over TCPA claims).
124. In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,
30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7964 n.3, available at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-1572A1_Rcd.pdf.
125. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
126. Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1171 (11th Cir. 2019).
127. Id.
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previously inadequate in law.’”128 Justice Kennedy went further in Lujan,
arguing “Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains
of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed
before.”129 Congress has done just that with the TCPA. Historical torts
alone, therefore, should not prevent an injury from being deemed
“concrete.”
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Modern Approach: One Text is Sufficient
The Ninth Circuit’s decision to grant Article III standing in Van Patten
was correct because it comports with the guidance of the Supreme Court,
is aligned with the legislative history of the TCPA, and is an appropriate
response to the modern scourge of robotexting.
1. The Ninth Circuit’s analysis aligns with the Supreme Court’s standing
guidelines.
First, the Ninth Circuit’s decision comports with the guidance of Lujan
and Spokeo. The first Lujan prong requires a claimant to have suffered an
“injury-in-fact.”130 The plaintiff in Van Patten suffered an “injury-in-fact”
when he received two promotional text messages from the defendant.131
The Supreme Court directs that an “injury-in-fact” must be both (a)
“concrete and particularized” and (b) “actual or imminent, not
‘conjectural or hypothetical.’”132 In situations where the harm may be
concrete, but intangible, the Supreme Court directs that history and the
judgment of Congress, particularly any provided statutory rights, can be
instructive but not dispositive of standing. 133 While there was no
argument that the injury was hypothetical, there was doubt whether the
injury was concrete.134 However, the straightforward text of the TCPA
makes clear that the receipt of two text messages is also concrete and
particularized, satisfying the “injury-in-fact” requirement.
First, the injury in Van Patten was particularized because the messages
in question were received by the plaintiff personally.135 Next, the injury
was concrete and not abstract. The plaintiff was not merely on a list of
consumers to receive promotional messages, but actually received two

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S 555, 578 (1992)).
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 560.
Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Group, 847 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 2017).
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1042.
Id. at 1041.
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text messages from the defendant.136 While the harm of receiving a text
message is surely intangible, it is nonetheless concrete given Congress’
direct judgment of unsolicited communications as an injury demonstrated
by the passage of the TCPA and further supported by the Supreme Court’s
judgment that a text “qualifies as a call.”137 Just as the Spokeo Court
directed, the violation of a statutory right can be a sufficient Article III
injury.138 In cases like this, where an intangible harm has been clearly
identified by Congress, the plaintiff is not required to “allege
any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.”139
Next, the injury must also be “trace[able] to the challenged act.” 140 In
this case, the receipt of the text messages is directly tied to the challenged
act of defendant sending the text messages. The injury is also “likely” to
be “redressed by a favorable decision.”141 A favorable decision for the
plaintiff in this case would result in an injunction and a minimum of
$1,000 with a maximum penalty of $3,000 if the court were to find that
the defendant willfully or knowingly violated the TCPA.142
2. The Ninth Circuit’s decision aligns with the legislative history of the
TCPA.
As discussed above, in cases of intangible injuries, courts are instructed
to look at both legislative history and Congress for guidance, because
“Congress is well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet
minimum Article III requirements.”143 Again, the Ninth Circuit’s decision
to confer Article III standing on the plaintiff in Van Patten is directly and
robustly supported by the guidance of Congress. In passing the TCPA,
Congress made several specific findings, including: the rapidly increasing
use of the technology by marketers, consumer outrage over the
“proliferation of intrusive, nuisance calls,” the inability of technology to

136. Id.
137. Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 667 (2016) (internal quotations omitted) (finding
receipt of a single text message included within reach of TCPA prohibition; see also Satterfield v. Simon
& Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We hold that a voice message or a text message are
not distinguishable in terms of being an invasion of privacy.”). Id.
138. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
139. Id.
140. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 4142 (1976)).
141. Id.
142. 47 U.S.C.S § 227(b)(3); Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Group, 847 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir.
2017)(defendant sent two text messages to plaintiff, penalized at $500 each or treble damages if sent
willingly and knowingly).
143. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1540.
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combat the crisis, and safety risks that can be posed by robocalls.144 All
of these Congressional findings about automated calls are true for
robotexts as well—even if a consumer receives just a single message.
While automated text messages are a different type of contact than was
originally contemplated by the TCPA, their status as a concrete injury is
equally supported by these Congressional findings. First, the use of
automated text messaging by marketers has been rapidly increasing and
shows no signs of slowing down.145 Like the consumer outrage towards
telemarketers highlighted by Congress in the TCPA, consumer sentiment
towards robotexts remains equally strong. In 2018, consumers filed over
93,000 complaints about unwanted text messages, up from around 70,000
in 2017.146 Moreover, just as Congress supported their legislation by
citing the inability of technology to combat the scourge of telemarketing,
current technology continues to lag behind. The FCC has been proactive
in this regard—working with carriers to employ filters for some spam
messages—but acknowledges there is still a 2.8% spam rate for text
messages.147
Finally, just as Congress recognized telemarketing risked tying up
phone lines and interfering with emergency communication, the FCC also
recognized the negative impacts robotexts can have on emergency
communication.148 Increases in the number of spam text messages
threaten the legitimacy of texting as a whole, the National Emergency
Number Association argues, and puts services like to Text-to-911149 at
risk by threatening the viability of the entire text messaging platform. 150
3. The Ninth Circuit’s decision creates logical policy for a modern
problem.
The Ninth Circuit’s grant of Article III standing in Van Patten also
makes for pragmatic policy. The Supreme Court has acknowledged
144. Telephone Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2, ¶¶1-4, 5, 6, 11, 105 Stat. 2394
(1991).
145. Bindley, supra note 48 (In 2019, T-Mobile reported a 20% increase each month in the number
of robotexts they blocked—blocking 1M spam texts each day in July of that year.).
146. Id.
147. Press Release, FCC, FCC Chairman Proposes Measures To Reduce Unwanted Robocalls And
Support
Blocking
Of
Spam
Robotexts
2
(Nov.
20,
2018),
available
at
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-355188A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/77GG-FUVV].
148. Id.
149. Text-to-911 is a service available in select U.S. locations that allows users to text, rather than
call 911. The service is used primarily by individuals with disabilities. Text-to-911: What You Need to
Know,
FCC
(Jan.
6.
2020),
https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/text-to-911__what_you_need_to_know.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8DU-4BPK].
150. Letter from Nat’l Emergency No. Ass’n to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, (Dec. 21,
2015), available at [https://perma.cc/XA86-W9QF].
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Congress’ determination that the nuisance of uninvited telemarketing is
an “intrusive invasion of privacy.” 151 When the TCPA was passed, this
could only have been in reference to calls made to landline phones. But
as technology has progressed, so too has our collective understanding of
what constitutes an invasion of privacy.152 Many circuit courts have
recognized this technological innovation for what it is and have held
communications like prerecorded voicemail and ringless voicemails to be
a concrete injuries under the TCPA.153
The very same invasion of privacy and nuisance concerns are presented
with robotexting claims. Modern life necessitates near constant
connectivity for many people; for others, smartphone use has nonetheless
become a part of their daily life. 154 This makes the invasion of privacy
contemplated by Congress that much more problematic for cell phone
users receiving a robotext. Rather than solely intruding into a consumer’s
home via their landline, a cell phone contact results in an intrusion into
the home and wherever the recipient is at the time. This could result in an
intrusive contact at work, in their car, in a private meeting, or in someone
else’s home, in addition to their own home. Marketers knowingly take
advantage of this constant connectivity and intrude into consumers’ lives
when they send robotexts, far beyond the intrusion of a ringing landline
in their home. This intrusive invasion into the lives of consumers is surely
akin to historical torts related to privacy, particularly when considering
the Supreme Court’s guidance that Congress can “elevate . . . de facto
injuries that were previously inadequate in law.” 155

151. Telephone Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2, ¶6 (1991) (“Many consumers
are outraged over the proliferation of intrusive, nuisance calls to their homes from telemarketers.”); See
also Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 372 (2012) (recognizing Congressional findings in
the TCPA before holding that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over TCPA claims).
152. See Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, 569 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding text messages
fall within definition of call and likewise finding uninvited text messages to be identical to calls in terms
of privacy invasion).
153. See Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 351 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding prerecorded
voicemails to be “the very harm that Congress sought to prevent”); Saunders v. Dyck O'Neal, Inc., 319 F.
Supp. 3d 907, 911 (W.D. Mich. 2018) (“use of direct to voicemail technology is a ‘call’ and falls within
the purview of the TCPA”); Gurzi v. Penn Credit Corp., No. 6:19-cv-823-Orl-31EJK, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 56582, at *10, *11 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2020) (finding “the broader context of the statute as a
whole supports the Court's finding that direct-to-voicemail messages fall within the TCPA”).
154. See generally Amy He, Average US Time Spent with Mobile in 2019 Has Increased,
EMARKETER (June 4, 2019), https://www.emarketer.com/content/average-us-time-spent-with-mobile-in2019-has-increased [https://perma.cc/JJL2-EGZZ] (the average U.S. adult spent 3 hours, 43 minutes using
their phone each day in 2019).
155. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S 555, 578 (1992) (internal quotations omitted); see also Susinno, 862 F.3d at 351. (elevating a
single received call to intrusion upon seclusion given the guidance in Spokeo).
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C. The Ideal Approach to a Modern Problem
This Section first provides a proposed framework to analyze modern
text-based TCPA claims using the Supreme Court’s standing guidance
and the TCPA guidance provided by district courts. Then, this Section
proposes a solution to the concern that federal district courts may become
overwhelmed by an increased number of TCPA claims given the potential
for an increased caseload.
1. The Proposed Framework
The early debate in Congress about the TCPA, makes clear that the law
was enacted to protect consumers. Images of interrupted family dinners,
grandparents being rushed out of bed, and fraud were all kept at the
forefront when pushing the bill forward.156 The ideal approach for courts
to assess TCPA claims must do the same: put consumers first. The Ninth
Circuit’s approach in Van Patten serves as a good starting point for this
analysis. In practice, this should include a common-sense analysis of the
legislation and relevant Congressional testimony to determine the
following: first, whether the alleged injury falls within the scope of the
TCPA’s intended protection. For text messages, this is widely understood
to be true. As new technology is developed and weaponized against
consumers, courts should focus on the core elements of the
communication. If a communication targets a personal device and is
automated, commercial, and nonconsensual, it should fall within the grasp
of the TCPA and be a sufficient injury-in-fact.
The standing analysis should then follow the consumer-friendly
guidance of the Ninth Circuit in assessing whether (1) the plaintiff
suffered an injury-in-fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged
conduct, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.157 The focus of the court’s analysis, as was the focus of this
Note, will likely be the “injury-in-fact” requirement, particularly whether
the harm is “concrete.”158 While not dispositive of a concrete injury, if a
communication is found to fit the proposed definition of a TCPA
communication as provided above, the plaintiff should, more often than
not, satisfy the Article III injury-in-fact requirements.159 In short, a
156. See supra Part II.A.
157. Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Group, 847 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Lujan, 504
U.S. at 560-61).
158. While not discussed at length in this proposed framework, the analysis must also ensure the
injury-in-fact is traceable to the challenged conduct and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.
Id.
159. See Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043 (“A plaintiff alleging a violation under the TCPA ‘need not
allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.’”) (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at
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plaintiff receiving an automated, commercial, and nonconsensual contact
on a personal device “need not allege any additional harm beyond the one
Congress has identified” to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.160
While historical parallels in tort may also be considered, they should not
weigh heavily in this analysis given the rapid innovation in
communication technology in recent years.
2. A Proposed Shift to FCC Administrative Law Judges
A significant concern for granting standing to plaintiffs alleging a
TCPA violation of a single text message is the potential for federal courts
to become overburdened and backlogged with a high number of lowvalue TCPA cases. This concern can be alleviated by processing cases
below a certain threshold through the FCC’s Office of Administrative
Law Judges.161 Not only would this shift to Administrative Law Judges
alleviate the already burdened federal courts, but it would also provide an
increased level of uniformity in the enforcement of TCPA claims 162
IV. CONCLUSION
As cell phones continue to play an increased role in the lives of
consumers, so too will automated text messages aimed at defrauding our
nation’s most vulnerable and downright annoying the rest of us. Congress
enacted the TCPA to combat this intrusion and, as technology has
evolved, so too should federal courts to ensure a full-powered TCPA is in
force. To ensure consumers are protected under the TCPA as Congress
intended, courts must find automated, unwanted text messages to be a
concrete injury-in-fact for purposes of Article III standing. TCPA claims
should be assessed on their merits, not on gatekeeping principles in direct
conflict with the guidance of Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
realities of modern technology.
While the FCC continues to develop new technology to combat
robotexts, Congress can, and should, pass an amendment to explicitly
include receipt of a robotext as a concrete harm under the TCPA. Courts
like the Eleventh Circuit may still choose to dismiss the case for lack of
1549) (emphasis in original).
160. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (emphasis in original).
161. See generally Office of Administrative Law Judges, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/administrativelaw-judges [https://perma.cc/DHT4-NYUS].
162. Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 372 (2012) (acknowledging Congressional
desire for uniformity as support for a federal cause of action); see 134 CONG. REC. 15973 (daily ed. June
27, 1988) (statement of Rep. Oxley) Congressman Oxley argued a federal private cause of action would
“promote nationwide enforcement and uniformity of decision-making” for the Telemarketing Fraud
Prevention Act of 1988.
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standing, but an explicit inclusion of the harm within the TCPA would
make it much more difficult to ignore these claims. In the meantime, the
approach proposed in this Note ensures the TCPA is enforced to its full
potential by honoring the aims of Congress, following the Article III
standing guidance of the Supreme Court, and above all, protecting
consumers.
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